Collaboration and competition in presence of imperfect information and non-linear pricing

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Date

2012

Author

Karabaş, Şükriye

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In this thesis, a market is assumed with n competing buyers where price is an inverse linear function of the quantity supplied to the market. The buyers get engaged in Cournot competition, but may also collaborate on purchasing decisions from a supplier. The supplier offers a quantity discount, as the quantity purchased increases unit price decreases. Furthermore, the demand base in the market is uncertain, but the buyers may get a signal of the demand. In this setting, the value of collaboration, information sharing and non-linear pricing is analyzed.

Subject Keywords

Nonlinear pricing., Competition., Marketing

URI

http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12614306/index.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/21546

Collections

Graduate School of Natural and Applied Sciences, Thesis

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Citation Formats

Ş. Karabaş, “Collaboration and competition in presence of imperfect information and non-linear pricing,” M.S. - Master of Science, Middle East Technical University, 2012.