The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities

Koska, Ahmet Onur
Onur, Ilke
Staehler, Frank
We scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.


Interim efficient auctions with interdependent valuations
Küçükşenel, Serkan (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2012-05-01)
We provide a characterization of interim efficient auctions and examine their properties in the presence of informational interdependent valuations. We show that buyers can be awarded the auctioned item less often than the efficient level. We also show that buyers obtain the item more often as the degree of heterogeneity in preferences increases, even though profitability of trade does not depend on the heterogeneity in preferences.
Other-regarding preferences in organizational hierarchies
Saygili, Kemal; Küçükşenel, Serkan (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2019-04-01)
In this paper, we provide new theoretical insights about the role of collusion in organizational hierarchies by combining the standard principal-supervisor-agent framework with a theory of social preferences. Extending Tirole's (J Law Econ Organ 2(2):181-214, 1986) model of hierarchy with the inclusion of Fehr and Schmidt (Q J Econ 114(3):817-868, 1999) type of other-regarding preferences, the links between inequity aversion, collusive behavior and changes in optimal contracts are studied. It turns out that...
Analysis of an inventory system under supply uncertainty
Gullu, R; Onol, E; Erkip, N (Elsevier BV, 1999-03-20)
In this paper, we analyze a periodic review, single-item inventory model under supply uncertainty. The objective is to minimize expected holding and backorder costs over a finite planning horizon under the supply constraints. The uncertainty in supply is modeled using a three-point probability mass function. The supply is either completely available, partially available, or the supply is unavailable. Machine breakdowns, shortages in the capacity of the supplier, strikes, etc., are possible causes of uncerta...
Harman, Mustafa; Bakal, İsmail Serdar; Duran, Serhan; Department of Industrial Engineering (2022-2-11)
This thesis aims to investigate the extent and limitations of managerial accounting concepts within ERP systems for medium to big-sized companies, whose transactions and data generation are huge and require integrated, online, and real-time processing on a common database. The main purpose for managerial accounting within standard ERP systems is to automate costing, budgeting, and cost accounting by integrating with functional modules. This is not complete automation. The extent and limitations of this aut...
The influence of nationality and gender on ethical sensitivity: An application of the issue-contingent model
Simga-Mugan, C; Daly, BA; Onkal, D; Kavut, L (Springer Science and Business Media LLC, 2005-03-01)
When a member of an organization has to make a decision or act in a way that may benefit some stakeholders at the expense of others, ethical dilemmas may arise. This paper examines ethical sensitivity regarding the duties to clients and owners (principals), employees (agents), and responsibilities to society (third parties). Within this framework, ethical perceptions of male and female managers are compared between the U.S. and Turkey - two countries that differ on power distance as well as the individualis...
Citation Formats
A. O. Koska, I. Onur, and F. Staehler, “The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities,” JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, pp. 107–136, 2018, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: