Date

1975

Author

Şenyapılı, Tansı

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One of the important problems in the field of city planning is the lack of a general, comprehensive,theoretical framework. Urban simulation games (USG) are one attempt on the part of the urban planners, to create a multi-dimensiona*! approach to urban problems. USG is a new technique for Turkish planning circles therefore it is important to discuss whether this approach which has been developed for countries where a free market mechanism is dominant, is applicable to developing countries like Turkey. The article begins by defining the terminology used within it. Simulation is defined as a synthetic, artificial model of a system that reflects real interrelations. The aim in simulation is to comprehend the system, the way it works, its control variables and parameters and to test and compare consequences of alternate decisions. Games are defined as any competitition that is subject to definite rules and regulations and where the consequences depend on chance or force. The first games were war games simulating warfare. War games developed into mathematical games after 1927 when von Neumann introduced the theory of mathematical games. Compared with other previously knowi planning techniques, the theory of mathematical games introduced the element of risk. In time, with development of computers, mathematical games were developed and were adapted by different diciplines including urban planning. Since an urban system is too complex to reproduce for laboratory studies and since urban processes contain too many probabilistic elements, USG becomes a useful tool to reproduce, test and study urban systems for planning purposes. The difference between mathematical games and USG is that in the former the players play a limited game since they are aware of the strategies available to their rivals but do not know which specific one the rival will choose. On the other hand, in an urban environment the complete set of strategies available is not known. Besides there may be as many players as there are decision groups in the city, one player's loss is not necessarily the other player's gain. The players are no longer definite enemies but are likely to form coalitions to increase mutual advantages. Examples of a land-use game and a decision game are discussed in the article. The examples show very clearly that USG, as developed and played in the West, are typical market economy games. The hypothesis is the existance of power groups and intensive competiton in the city. Each group has a different aim and each group strives to maximize its own benefits. Urban games define the simulation of the bargaining process among these groups for maximization of their profits. The final decision rests with the group or groups with the highest bargaining power. Private sector plays the game, the role of the public sector is limited to consultation only. This model does not fit the Turkish model and similar models where planning becomes less and less probabilistic. Suppose in Turkey we stage a game for the purpose of exposing the impact of interrelations between power groups on the urban spatial pattern, the reaction of the system to these interrelations and to observe the evaluation pattern. The following urban elements may be represented in the game: residential group (squatters and other), speculators (land and building), commerce and occupational groups (represented by the relevant chambers), municipal transport co., local politicians, planners. From this point on difficulties will face the game designer. First of all the planner in the game is detached vertically and horizontally from other planners. There are no clear aims, principles and strategies facing him, the limits of his authority and responsibility are not clear, his role is not defined well, he has no organized, formal relations with the researchers and implementors. In short, he does not know how Co balance power group welfare with public welfare. The planner and the implementor are so uncoordinated that important conflict may rise and the game may turn into a zero-sum game. On the other hand, interrelations between power groups are not clear. Eg. the speculators are not an open and organized group as in the western countries. The planner and the speculator can easily fall into conflict as the speculators' actions usually raises threshold costs whereas the planners aim at minimizing them. The speculator and the implementor are more likely to form coalitions. The inclusion of squatters as players also raises problems as these are marginal groups lacking legal status on land. The speculators and the politicians are more lenient to keeping their status illegal whereas the planner works to legalize their position. On the other hand, any decision related to legalization should come from higher echelons of planning. The urban planner's formal duty is to propose spatial solutions which in sum are no real solutions before socio-economic integration and legalization solutions are reached. As to the other specialized groups like industrialists: theoretically the planner is to locate these groups in space. Location decisions are not given through a discussion among other players. Yet when this is the case the game turns into one played among planners. We reach the same point if we want to simulate the process of implementation rather than planning. For this is the stage where the influence of fewer groups is most intensive. Yet it is impossible to simulate this stage as the bargains are not known and intertwined and complex, herefore the constraints of mixed economy and more centralized planning limit the degrees of freedom of possibility of USG as developed in the west» as planning tools in Turkey.

URI

http://jfa.arch.metu.edu.tr/archive/0258-5316/1975/cilt01/sayi_2/211-225.pdf
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/51329

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Department of Architecture, Article