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Lying individually or in a game in the presence of norm enforcer
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Lying Individually or In A Game In the Presence of Norm Enforcer.pdf
Date
2021-9
Author
Gurallar, Kübra
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We conduct an online experiment to explore the role of symmetric externalities and third-party (norm enforcer) punishment on dishonest behavior. In particular, for symmetric externality treatments, we vary whether reports of group members change payoff of each other. To study how possibility of third-party punishment affects reporting behavior, we introduce a third-party with punishment option into the setting. We find that the effect of symmetric externalities on dishonest behavior is insignificant at aggregate level. However, further analysis of individual data shows that symmetric externalities decrease probability of dishonest reporting if dishonesty is advantageous. We observe no significant effect of third-party punishment on reporting behavior of subjects both at individual level and aggregate level. Moreover, our findings suggest that when both of the group members report dishonestly to their advantage, third parties impose more punishment in no symmetric externality treatment than symmetric externality treatment.
Subject Keywords
Dishonesty
,
Symmetric externality
,
Social norms
,
Third-party punishment
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/92193
Collections
Graduate School of Social Sciences, Thesis
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K. Gurallar, “Lying individually or in a game in the presence of norm enforcer,” M.S. - Master of Science, Middle East Technical University, 2021.