A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness

This paper addresses John Searle's criticism of the integrated information theory of consciousness (IITC for short). Among other things, Searle claimed that, since information is a syntactic notion, IITC cannot account for the content of consciousness. He also argued that IITC cannot explain consciousness in causal terms. In this paper, I demonstrate that the original formulation of IITC is compatible with a structuralist reading. After that, I explain how a structuralist reconstruction of IITC could deal with the objections that Searle raised. Among other things, I argue that IITC could provide genuine scientific explanations of consciousness, but the explanations are to be presented in structural, rather than causal, terms.


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Citation Formats
M. Davoody Benı, “A Structuralist Defence of the Integrated Information Theory of Consciousness,” JOURNAL OF CONSCIOUSNESS STUDIES, vol. 25, no. 9-10, pp. 75–98, 2018, Accessed: 00, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/93422.