Serkan Sarıtaş

E-mail

ssaritas@metu.edu.tr

Department

Department of Electrical and Electronics Engineering

ORCID

0000-0001-5638-3213

Scopus Author ID

35171233800

Web of Science Researcher ID

C-6374-2019

Signaling Games for Log-Concave Distributions: Number of Bins and Properties of Equilibria Kazikli, Ertan; Sarıtaş, Serkan; GEZİCİ, Sinan; Linder, Tamas; Yuksel, Serdar (2022-03-01) We investigate the equilibrium behavior for the decentralized cheap talk problem for real random variables and quadratic cost criteria in which an encoder and a decoder have misaligned objective functions. In prior work, i...
Privacy Signaling Games with Binary Alphabets Stavrou, Photios A.; Sarıtaş, Serkan; Skoglund, Mikael (2022-01-01) In this paper, we consider a privacy signaling game problem for binary alphabets and single-bit transmission where a transmitter has a pair of messages, one of which is a casual message that needs to be conveyed, whereas t...
Adversarial Attacks on CFO-Based Continuous Physical Layer Authentication: A Game Theoretic Study Sarıtaş, Serkan; Thobaben, Ragnar; Sandberg, Henrik; Dan, Gyorgy (2021-06-01) 5G and beyond 5G low power wireless networks make Internet of Things (IoT) and Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) applications capable of serving massive amounts of devices and machines. Due to the broadcast nature of wireless n...
Quadratic Signaling Games with Channel Combining Ratio Sarıtaş, Serkan; Thobaben, Ragnar; Skoglund, Mikael (2021-01-01) In this study, Nash and Stackelberg equilibria of single-stage and multi-stage quadratic signaling games between an encoder and a decoder are investigated. In the considered setup, the objective functions of the encoder an...
Continuous Authentication Security Games Sarıtaş, Serkan; Shereen, Ezzeldin; Sandberg, Henrik; Dán, György (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 2021-01-01)
A Nash equilibrium-based moving target defense against stealthy sensor attacks Umsonst, David; Sarıtaş, Serkan; Sandberg, Henrik (2020-12-14) © 2020 IEEE.This paper investigates a moving target defense strategy based on detector threshold switching against stealthy sensor attacks. We model the interactions between the attacker and the defender as a game. While t...
Asymptotic Security of Control Systems by Covert Reaction: Repeated Signaling Game with Undisclosed Belief Sasahara, Hampei; Sarıtaş, Serkan; Sandberg, Henrik (2020-12-14) This study investigates the relationship between resilience of control systems to attacks and the information available to malicious attackers. Specifically, it is shown that control systems are guaranteed to be secure in ...
Dynamic signaling games with quadratic criteria under Nash and Stackelberg equilibria Yuksel, Serdar; Sarıtaş, Serkan; Gezici, Sinan (2020-05-01) This paper considers dynamic (multi-stage) signaling games involving an encoder and a decoder who have subjective models on the cost functions. We consider both Nash (simultaneous-move) and Stackelberg (leader-follower) eq...
Passive Fault-tolerant Estimation under Strategic Adversarial Bias Sarıtaş, Serkan; Sandberg, Henrik (2020-01-01) This paper is concerned with the problem of fault-tolerant estimation in cyber-physical systems. In cyber-physical systems, such as critical infrastructures, networked embedded sensors are widely used for monitoring and ca...
Hypothesis Testing Under Subjective Priors and Costs as a Signaling Game Sarıtaş, Serkan; Yuksel, Serdar (2019-10-01) Many communication, sensor network, and networked control problems involve agents (decision makers) which have either misaligned objective functions or subjective probabilistic models. In the context of such setups, we con...

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