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Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter
Date
2011-01-01
Author
Küçükşenel, Serkan
Metadata
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This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
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This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents' preferences.
Subject Keywords
College admissions problem
,
Core
,
Implementation
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/48977
Journal
B E JOURNAL OF THEORETICAL ECONOMICS
DOI
https://doi.org/10.2202/1935-1704.1772
Collections
Department of Economics, Article