Implementation of the Core in College Admissions Problems When Colleagues Matter

Date

2011-01-01

Author

Küçükşenel, Serkan

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This paper presents mechanisms implementing the core correspondence of many-to-one matching markets, such as college admissions problems, where the students have preferences over the other students who would attend the same college. We first present a sequential mechanism implementing the core. We then show that simple two-stage mechanisms, which mimics the real-life processes, cannot be used to implement the core correspondence in subgame perfect Nash equilibrium even with strong assumptions on agents' preferences.

Subject Keywords

College admissions problem, Core, Implementation

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/48977

Collections

Department of Economics, Article