Coordination with indirect messages in the stag-hunt game

We theoretically investigate the effect of allowing one-sided communication with costless indirect messages on stag-hunt game outcomes. Since Heinemann et al. (2009) show that players who avoid risk also avoid strategic uncertainty, we chose a sender's level of risk aversion as the indirect message. We show that if both sender and receiver interpret the message content similarly, it is possible that they end up either on the risk-dominant or on the payoffdominant equilibrium. We also show that players in the extreme risk groups are willing to declare risk attitudes truthfully to increase the probability of coordination. On the other hand, players in the medium risk-averse group are willing to mimic the risk-loving group to achieve efficient coordination


Coordination with indirect messages in the Stag-Hunt game
Büyükboyacı Hanay, Mürüvvet İlknur; Küçükşenel, Serkan (2017-08-01)
Costly Pre-Play Communication and Coordination in Stag-Hunt Games
Büyükboyacı Hanay, Mürüvvet İlknur; Küçükşenel, Serkan (2017-09-01)
In this paper, we experimentally investigate the impact of costly indirect and direct messages on coordination levels in a stag-hunt game. Three main insights emerge from our experiments. First, we find a significant decrease in message usage with message cost in both treatments and a higher decrease in the indirect-message treatment. Second, we find that although there is no significant effect of costless or costly indirect messages on the frequency of risky actions, both costless, and costly direct messag...
Consumer Responses to Toyota s Crisis Communication Tactics
Wasti Pamuksuz, Syeda Nazlı (2015-09-01)
The timing of particular crisis communication tactics and reactions to them in real life cases are relatively understudied. Using Toyota’s unintended acceleration problem during 2009- 2010, we investigate the effects on sales throughout the crisis period (24 months) of the categories of communication tactics used by Toyota. Toyota’s crisis communication tactics were determined through a content analysis of the related news articles in the New York Times and the Wall Street Journal, and the sales data was ob...
Two-Person Zero-Sum Communicating Stochastic Games
Avşar, Zeynep Müge (1997-10-26)
For undiscounted two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, a solution procedure is proposed that exploits the communication property, i.e., working with irreducible games over restricted strategy spaces. The proposed procedure gives the value of the communicating game with an arbitrarily small error when the value is independent of the initial state.
Designing narratology-based educational games with non-players
Inal, Yavuz; Karakus, Turkan; Çağıltay, Kürşat (2008-06-27)
Challenges of designing an educational game cause an ongoing debate that while one side proposes ludology as the key for a computer game, other side proposes narratology as the most important part of game environment. Ludologic attributes of games have been preferred more than narrative ones. However, results of studies attempted to reveal importance of narrative structures and storytelling for computer games, especially for educational ones. In the present study, narratology including storytelling and narr...
Citation Formats
M. İ. Büyükboyacı Hanay and S. Küçükşenel, “Coordination with indirect messages in the stag-hunt game,” ODTÜ Gelişme Dergisi, vol. 44, no. 2, pp. 177–186, 2017, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: