Two-Person Zero-Sum Communicating Stochastic Games

1997-10-26
For undiscounted two-person zero-sum communicating stochastic games with finite state and action spaces, a solution procedure is proposed that exploits the communication property, i.e., working with irreducible games over restricted strategy spaces. The proposed procedure gives the value of the communicating game with an arbitrarily small error when the value is independent of the initial state.

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Citation Formats
Z. M. Avşar, “Two-Person Zero-Sum Communicating Stochastic Games,” presented at the INFORMS Conference, Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences (1997), Texas, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri, 1997, Accessed: 00, 2021. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/71161.