Causal determinants, reasons, and substantive autonomy: A critical approach to agency

Date

2007-01-01

Author

Baç, Mutlu Murat

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Although the notion of agency presents itself as an attractive solution to the puzzle of free will, it faces a problem vis-a-vis the nature of reasons that are purported to lie behind actions. In this paper I first point out the significance of a paradigm shift that emerges with the agency view. Then I argue that the agency theories nonetheless fail in general to give a satisfactory account of various sorts of reasons underlying our actions and choices. In trying to enlighten the multi-faceted nature of actions and agency, I define a novel concept, "substantive autonomy," and claim that it is a basic fact valid for all animals, not only humans, that are capable of initiating action. Reasons may indeed be lying behind our actions in a non-deterministic and ubiquitous manner but agency often works in the absence of sophisticated (discursive) reasons which are evidently characteristic of humans.

Subject Keywords

Agency, Event causation, Free will, Reasons, Substantive autonomy

URI

https://hdl.handle.net/11511/54443

Journal

PROBLEMOS

Collections

Department of Philosophy, Article

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Citation Formats

M. M. Baç, “Causal determinants, reasons, and substantive autonomy: A critical approach to agency,” PROBLEMOS, pp. 135–144, 2007, Accessed: 00, 2020. [Online]. Available: https://hdl.handle.net/11511/54443.