Kant's dichotomic philosophy in the critique of judgement

Bal, Metin
This thesis concentrates mainly on Kant's aesthetic philosophy namely on the third Critique, The Critique of Judgement. Throughout his first two Critiques Kant focuses his attention on the most sublime end (eternal peace) and on the ideas of reason (freedom, God, soul). In the first and second Critiques ideas had not been proved to be used with legacy. Thus, this illegal attitude of reason became a wideknown 'gap' of Kant's philosophy. In The Critique of Practical Reason, sensibility is still neglected so the ideas remain belong to a supersensible world. Thus, so far as ethics remains merely in the limits of reason it would be stillborn again. In this condition, aesthetics as the reflection on beautiful is nominated to help reason. For this the main subject of Kantin The Critique of Judgement is the creation of the 'beautiful soul'. This is shown in the triangle of religion, ethics, and aesthetics. In brief, Recognizing his failure in passing from the theoretical philosophy to the practical philosophy, Kant wants to find a legal passage between the two in The Critique of Judgement. This time Kant wishes the transition or leap be not too violent. But in the end the transition remains as a leap.
Citation Formats
M. Bal, “Kant’s dichotomic philosophy in the critique of judgement,” Middle East Technical University, 2002.