Show/Hide Menu
Hide/Show Apps
anonymousUser
Logout
Türkçe
Türkçe
Search
Search
Login
Login
OpenMETU
OpenMETU
About
About
Açık Bilim Politikası
Açık Bilim Politikası
Frequently Asked Questions
Frequently Asked Questions
Browse
Browse
By Issue Date
By Issue Date
Authors
Authors
Titles
Titles
Subjects
Subjects
Communities & Collections
Communities & Collections
Memories of the Fourth Condition and Lessons to be Learned from Suspicious Externalism
Date
2009-01-01
Author
Baç, Mutlu Murat
Metadata
Show full item record
This work is licensed under a
Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International License
.
Item Usage Stats
0
views
0
downloads
A significant and interesting part of the post-Gettier literature regarding the analysis of propositional knowledge is the attempt to supplement the traditional tripartite analysis by employing a fourth condition regarding the defeasibility of evidence and thus to preclude the counterexamples displayed in Gettier's original article. My aim in this paper is to critically examine the sort of externalism that accompanies the most promising of the proposed fourth conditions, due to Pollock, in order to offer some fresh insights on this old epistemological issue. I argue that Pollock's paradigmatic treatment of the matter gives rise to a critical problem with regard to the exact role of the fourth condition and its relation with the onto-semantic or alethic condition of propositional knowledge, to wit, truth. In the light of this discussion, I draw certain conclusions about epistemic externalism and point out some of its theoretical shortcomings.
Subject Keywords
Externalism
,
Fourth condition
,
Gettier
,
Knowledge
,
Pollock
,
Truth
,
Undefeasibility
URI
https://hdl.handle.net/11511/55327
Journal
ORGANON F
Collections
Department of Philosophy, Article